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Little is known about the effects of revealing information on relative performance during a 
dynamic  tournament.  We  empirically  study  the  impact  of  interim  rank  on  risk  taking  and 
performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments for large rewards. As our 
data allows us to observe both the intended action and the performance of each participant, we 
can thus measure risk taking and performance separately. We present two key findings. First, 
risk  taking  exhibits  an  inverted-U  relationship  with  interim  rank.  Revealing  information  on 
relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind the interim leaders to take greater 
risks. Second, competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite 
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1. Introduction  
Individuals competing in tournaments are rewarded on the basis of their relative, rather than 
absolute, performance. Many everyday fields of economic activity are characterized by such a 
tournament-like structure. Employees and managers in labor markets, for example, are subject to 
relative performance evaluations within a firm; in financial markets, mutual funds compete in 
attracting new funds on the basis of their relative performance; in product markets, companies 
compete in patent races to secure the rights to new products; in schools, students and teachers 
may be ranked according to their relative performance; and, finally, the majority of sporting 
events are organized as tournaments.  
An extensive literature emphasizes the role of tournaments in realigning the incentives of the 
parties involved (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). 
For instance, in the labor market, a tournament among managers could provide incentive for 
improved effort resulting in higher performance, thus mitigating the typical inefficiencies caused 
by the conflicting objectives of managers and shareholders. 
However, it is likely that tournaments affect not only choices concerning effort, but other 
aspects of individual behavior as well, including risk taking and performance under pressure. In 
addition, tournaments are often dynamic, so the incentives generated by the competition may be 
different for the individuals leading the competition and those lagging behind. Individuals with a 
high interim rank, for example, may try to protect their position by decreasing risk taking. Those 
lower down in the interim rank may engage in riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up with the 
leaders. Exactly how agents’ risk taking behavior and performance varies depending on relative 
performance in previous stages of the competition is still an open question, and fundamental to 
our understanding of tournaments in labor, financial and product markets. From a policy point of 3 
 
view, it is crucial to understand how disclosure of information on relative performance during a 
competition may affect participants’ subsequent behavior. 
An important branch of research is devoted to understanding how the behavior of individuals 
is  affected  by  tournaments  (Ehrenberg  and  Bognanno,  1990;  Knoeber  and  Thurman,  1994; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) and other performance evaluation schemes (Oyer, 1998; Lazear, 
2000;  Courty  and  Marschke,  2004; Bandiera,  Barankay  and  Rasul,  2007). However,  little  is 
known  about the impact of revealing information on relative performance during a dynamic 
tournament (Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez, 2009). In particular, there is no systematic evidence 
on how risk taking and performance are affected by interim ranking. The main obstacle is the 
difficulty involved in observing both the level of risk taken by competitors and their performance 
during a tournament.  
This paper describes how both risk taking and performance change depending on interim rank 
position. It exploits an unusually rich panel dataset derived from weightlifting competitions, with 
individual level information on professional athletes competing repeatedly in tournaments with 
substantial  rewards.  These  are  multistage  tournaments  with  the  distinctive  characteristic  of 
requiring athletes to publically announce in advance the amount they intend to lift at each stage. 
Access to  these  recorded  announcements, together with information  on  whether  the  lift  was 
successful  or  not,  affords  a  unique  opportunity  to  observe  both  the  intentions  and  the 
performance of all participants.  
Using  a  panel  dataset  containing  round-by-round  information  from  Olympic  Games  and 
World and European Championships between 1990 and 2006, we estimate how the announced 
weights  and  the  probability  of  a successful  lift  vary  depending  on  interim  rank. Since  what 
matters for the individual’s score is the amount successfully lifted (more details are given in 
Section 2), higher announcements represent a riskier strategy, in the sense that they imply a 4 
 
larger  difference  between  the  outcome  in  case  of  success  or  failure.  Therefore,  the  relation 
between  rank  and  announcement  is  informative  of  athletes’  risk-taking  behavior,  while  the 
relation between rank and the probability of a successful lift is informative of their performance. 
The probability that an athlete will succeed in lifting the declared weight during a specific 
attempt is much less than one. Obviously, better athletes are more likely to succeed in lifting a 
given weight, but the outcome of a specific attempt is still unpredictable to a certain extent. 
Interim ranking within a competition is affected by this random component of performance and 
is very volatile. Even the best athletes may find themselves at the bottom of the ranking in a 
certain  competition,  due  to  a  combination  of  their  own  bad  luck  and  the  success  of  their 
opponents.  This  variability  of  interim  ranking  provides  us  with  an  ideal  environment  for 
observing how professionals react when in the lead or when tailing other competitors. The panel 
dimension of the data allows us to control for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity at 
the individual, competition and year level. The multistage nature of the games even allows us to 
estimate specifications where we can control for joint individual-competition-year fixed effects.  
We present two key results. First, when lagging behind, competitors tend to take greater risks 
than  when  in  the  lead.  However,  risk-taking  exhibits  an  inverted-U  relationship  with  rank: 
announcements increase from first to sixth place, but decrease moving further down in the rank; 
after rank seventeen, the level of risk taken is not significantly different from first place. This 
implies  that  athletes  choose  riskier  strategies  when  ranked  closer  to  the  top,  reverting  to 
progressively safer strategies when placed further down. The magnitude of the impact of rank is 
significant. A shift from first to sixth place corresponds to a 1.8Kg increase in announcement, 
which is 50 percent of the average increase in announcement between two stages (see Section 2 
for a description of the rules).  5 
 
Our results are in line with the conventional wisdom that troubled firms and interim losers in 
corporate tournaments are more likely to take riskier strategies than market leaders, or that the 
trailing team in sports competitions may have a strong incentive to take greater risks. However, 
this paper provides evidence of a non-monotone relation between interim rank and risk taking. 
This is consistent with the observation that catching up with the leaders becomes progressively 
more unlikely as one moves down in the ranking. 
Our second result is that, on average, the probability of a successful lift (conditional on the 
chosen weight) significantly increases when moving down in the ranking. An athlete in sixth 
place is at least 10 percent more likely to lift the declared weight than when he is ranked first. 
This effect of ranking is surprising. One possible explanation is that athletes exert less effort 
when ranked at the top. However, since rewards are decreasing at a decreasing rate going down 
in the ranking, one would generally expect athletes to be more motivated and to exert greater 
effort when ranked at the top, where the gain from an increase in rank is highest. Therefore, one 
would expect that the probability of lifting a given weight would increase, not decrease, when an 
athlete is ranked closer to the top.
4 
An alternative explanation for this result is that athletes underperform under pressure, despite 
strong motivation and effort (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein and Mazar, 2005; Dohmen, 2008; 
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2009). This interpretation is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
that athletes’ performance may deteriorate as the stakes involved in achieving a successful lift 
rise, or when there are  strong  expectations for an outstanding performance.  In line  with the 
hypothesis that individuals perform badly under pressure, we show that the probability of failing 
to lift a given weight is higher when the competition is more intense and in more prestigious 
                                                 
4 The positive relation between rewards, motivation and effort seems to be accepted in the literature (Prendergast 1999), although 
with some exceptions (Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein and Thaler, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a and 2000b; Frey and 
Jegen, 2001; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). 6 
 
competitions. This is true  even  though  one  would  generally  expect  higher  effort  and  higher 
performance under such circumstances (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990).  
Are  these  results  specific  to  weightlifting  competitions?  We  also  present  results  from 
professional athletes in competitive diving, a sport which requires a very different set of skills 
(agility  versus  physical  strength).  We  find  consistent  evidence  that  professional  divers 
underperform when close to the top of the interim ranking, despite strong motivation to succeed. 
As in weightlifting, we find that divers underperform when competition is more intense and in 
more prestigious competitions.  
Our  work  is  related  to  a  growing  empirical  literature  on  tournaments.  Four  key  aspects 
distinguish our work from earlier studies. First, our paper focuses on the impact of interim rank 
within  a  tournament  on  risk  taking  and  performance.  Since  the  number  of  athletes  in 
weightlifting competitions is large, we can describe such effects for a wide range of interim 
ranks (from 1
st to 20
th). The existing literature has mainly focused on the impact of the overall 
level of prizes, or on different compensation schemes.
5 Second, most studies focus on either 
performance  or  risk  taking.  When  they  do  attempt  to  measure  risk  taking,  they  focus  on 
variability  in  performance  or  other  output  measures:  The  strategies  of  the  players  remain 
unobserved and risk taking is inferred from volatility in performance.
6 Differently from previous 
studies, our setting permits us to observe both the intended action and the performance of each 
participant, and measure risk taking separately from performance. Not only can we study the 
impact of interim rank on both variables, but we can also condition for the intended strategies of 
                                                 
5 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Becker and Huselid (1992) use data from golf tournaments and car racing respectively to 
study the link between prizes and performance. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) study the effect of different compensation schemes 
on performance of broiler chicken farmers. Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993) and Eriksson (1999) study corporate tournaments 
and executive compensation. 
6 Very little evidence is available on risk taking behavior in tournaments. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) provide some evidence 
that better farmers displayed less volatile performance. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show 
that  mutual  funds  with  relatively  low  mid-year  performance  increase  fund  volatility.  Bronars  and  Oettinger  (2001)  study 
variability in performance in golf tournaments. Similarly, Lee (2004) studies variability in payoffs in poker tournaments. 
Finally, in a study of soccer matches, Grund and Gurtler (2005) find that losing teams are more likely to make a risky substitution 
(e.g., replacing a defensive player with an offensive one). 7 
 
participants when comparing performance.
7 Third, we use an exceptionally rich panel dataset 
that allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in greater detail than previous studies. 
Finally, our results differ from those in previous studies by showing a inverse U-shaped relation 
between interim rank and risk taking and that performance decreases moving towards the top of 
the interim rank. These results could not be established without observing risk taking separately 
from performance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the structure 
and rules of weightlifting competitions and the data. Section 3 presents our identification strategy 
and the econometric framework. Section 4 reports our main results and robustness tests from 
weightlifting  and  diving  competitions.  Section  5  concludes  and  discusses  some  policy 
implications.  
2. A brief overview of weight lifting competitions and the data 
In weightlifting, competitors attempt to lift heavy weights mounted on steel bars.
8 Lifters 
perform two types of lifts - the snatch and the clean & jerk.
9 Lifters are allowed six attempts, 
three  for  each  type  of  lift.
10  The  competition  is  therefore  organized  in  six  stages.  At  the 
beginning of each stage, athletes announce how much they intend to lift by publicly writing their 
name  and  announcement  on  a  roster.
11  Then,  competitors  attempt  their  announced  lift  in 
increasing order, from the lightest to the heaviest weight. If they are unsuccessful at a particular 
                                                 
7 For example, consider the case in which leaders in a multistage tournament try to protect their position by taking low risk 
strategies  (strategies  with  low  payoffs  but  high  probability  of  success).  If  the  riskiness  involved  in  such  strategies  is  not 
observable to the econometrician, then comparing realized payoffs across individuals may not be informative about differences in 
effort. 
8 Weightlifting has a long history as an Olympic discipline. Men’s weightlifting was on the program of the first modern Olympic 
Games in Athens in 1896, while the first contemporary World Championships took place in London in 1891. 
9 In the snatch, they lift the bar to arm’s length above their head in one movement. In the clean & jerk, they lift the bar to their 
shoulders, stand up straight, and then jerk the bar to arm’s length above their head. 
10 Two hours before the start of each game, competitors are weighed and assigned an official bodyweight. This then determines 
the weight category in which they will compete. There are eight categories for men and seven for women. Athletes may switch 
between different categories over the course of their athletic careers. For this reason, our definition of a competitor throughout 
this paper is an athlete in a particular bodyweight category. An athlete’s bodyweight also plays a role in the event of two athletes 
lifting exactly the same weight; in this case, the competitor with the lower bodyweight wins.  
11 Announcements can be changed up to some time before the beginning of the stage. We observe the “final” announcements at 
the beginning of the stage. 8 
 
weight, the athletes have the option of reattempting the same lift or trying a heavier one in the 
following stage.  At  the  end  of the  competition,  each  athlete’s  highest  successful  lifts  in the 
snatch and the clean & jerk are summed to determine their final scores. Athletes are then ranked, 
with the highest score corresponding to first place. In addition, at the end of each stage, interim 
rankings are computed using the same procedure.
12 
The relationship between final rank and prizes is convex, particularly at the top. The first 
three athletes are awarded medals and receive most of the media coverage. Private sponsorships 
are also offered mainly to medal-winners, and gold medalists receive the lion’s share of fame and 
recognition. In comparison to other sports (such as tennis or golf), direct cash prizes are small, 
even  for  the  most  prestigious  competitions.  However,  national  teams  provide  substantial 
monetary rewards and other benefits such as civil service jobs, or employment in the national 
sport federation to medal winners in international competitions.
13 
In addition to such private rewards, the top twenty-five athletes earn points for their national 
teams’ classification. The allocation of these points is non-linear for the top three positions (the 
first athlete receives twenty-eight points, the second twenty-five and the third twenty-three), after 
which it becomes linear. Overall, the coaches and players we interviewed concur that there is a 
very significant drop in rewards between getting a medal and not getting one. In addition, there is 
a consensus that rewards generally decrease at a decreasing rate moving down in the ranking.
14  
Comprehensive round-by-round data for all athletes that participated in the most well-known 
weightlifting competitions (the Olympic Games and the World and European Championships) 
                                                 
12 For the second and third stage, the interim rank is computed using only the best successful lift in snatch. 
13 For the 2008 Olympic Games, the prizes provided by the American Federation were $25,200 for a gold medal, $22,500 for 
silver,  $20,700  for  bronze,  by  the  Chinese  (figures  for  2004)  €82,000,  €73,000,  €69,000,  by  the  Italian  €40,000,  €25,000, 
€15,000, and by the Greek €190,000, €130,000 and €100,000 respectively. These figures include only monetary rewards given by 
national institutions, leaving out any additional benefits (such as civil service jobs and free housing), which may also be offered 
by some countries, such as Greece and Italy, or private sponsorships, which can be the main source of income for medalists. 
Some information on prizes is provided in Appendix B. 
14
 In the empirical section that follows, we do not attempt to directly measure the monetary gains from a change in rank. Instead, 
we estimate the impact of rank on announcements and performance.  9 
 
from 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the International Weightlifting Database, yielding a total 
of 41,550 individual stage-specific observations for 3,763 athletes. For each observation we have 
information on the type of competition, date, location, athlete’s name, gender, weight category, 
country of origin, and bodyweight. We also have information on announcements and outcomes, 
together with the overall rank at the end of the competition, as well as at the end of snatch and 
clean & jerk lifts.
15 
Using this information, we reconstructed the interim ranking of all athletes at each stage of 
the  competition.
16  Table  1  provides  summary  statistics  on  announcement  and  frequency  of 
successful lifts. The average announcement increases from one stage to the next by roughly 
3Kg.
17 The frequency of successful lifts falls correspondingly by around 20 percent. In general, 
higher  weights  can  be  lifted  in  the  clean  and  jerk,  as  reflected  in  the  higher  average 
announcements.  
Since the focus of our  work is on the impact  of interim rank on athletes’ behavior, it is 
important  to  note  that  the  variability  of  ranking,  even  for  a  given  athlete  within  a  given 
competition,  is  significant.  On  average,  the  difference  between  the  maximum  and  minimum 
interim rank for a given individual within a competition is 6.4 positions, with the 25
th percentile 
experiencing a change of 3 positions and the 75
th percentile experiencing a change of 8 ranks. In 
other  words,  the  variability  in  ranking  is  such  that  even  very  consistent  weightlifters  may 
oscillate, for example, between getting a gold and getting no medal at all.  
 
 
                                                 
15 The outcome of 1 percent of the observations is missing, because the athlete did not attempt to lift the announced weight. 
Observations relating to such individuals in those specific competitions are excluded from the sample. 
16
 Our algorithm to reconstruct ranking was based on the official rules of the International Weightlifting Federation. We verified 
the results from our algorithm against the ranking information at the end of both snatch and clean & jerk, as well as the final 
overall ranking.  
17 After a successful attempt, athletes are required to increase their announcements by 1 Kg. 10 
 
3. Empirical Framework  
We characterize each athlete’s ability as a risk-reward frontier that describes the relationship 
between the announced weight and probability of success. This frontier is downward sloping for 
each athlete, since the probability of a successful lift naturally decreases as the announcement 
increases. Higher announcements increase the score difference between success and failure, and 
thus imply riskier strategies. 
Figure 1 plots the risk-reward frontiers for two hypothetical athletes of different abilities. The 
better athlete is characterized by the frontier on the right. Each  competitor can improve the 
probability  of  a successful  lift  by  increasing  the quality  and  intensity  of  training before the 
competition,  or  by  achieving  greater  concentration/determination  during  the  game  (i.e.,  by 
exerting more effort). Therefore, we can reinterpret the difference between the two curves as the 
impact of effort. Effort, however, is not the only potential explanation. Any variable affecting 
performance may shift the frontier, including psychological pressure, fear or emotions in general.  
At each round, athletes choose their announcement, measured on the horizontal axis in Figure 
1. This choice entails a fundamental trade-off between the gains from a higher successful lift and 
the  costs  of  a  higher  probability  of  failing.  In  other  words,  for  any  given  athlete,  a  higher 
announcement implies a higher probability of failure along with a higher reward for success, and 
a  larger  difference  between  the  payoffs  for  success  and  failure.  In  this  sense,  a  higher 
announcement implies that the athlete is pursuing a riskier strategy.
18 
In the next section, we first estimate how the choice of announcement varies depending on 
interim  ranking  (as  computed  at  the  end  of  the  previous  stage).  In  terms  of  Figure  1,  our 
estimates will describe athletes’ choice of a point on the horizontal axis. We then estimate the 
                                                 
18 The interpretation of the results is the same if one considers the variance in outcomes, instead of the absolute difference. For 
realistic values of the announcement and the probability of success, increases in announcement also correspond to increases in 
the (weighted) variance of outcomes.  11 
 
probability of a given individual successfully lifting the announced weight, and how this varies 
with ranking. In terms of Figure 1, our estimates will describe how athletes’ risk-reward frontiers 
change as ranking varies.  
 
3.1. The Determinants of Announcements 
We estimate models of the following general form: 
Announcementitjs = Xitj β0 + f(Rankitj(s-1), β1) + 
+ β2 Announcementitj(s-1) + β3 Successitj(s-1) + eitjs                                       (1) 
where Announcementitjs is the announcement of athlete i, in year t, in competition type j (a 
competition is classified as Olympic Game, World or European Championship), at stage s of the 
game (s=2,3,5,6)
19; Xitj is a vector that includes characteristics of the individual (binary indicators 
for  country  of  origin  and  whether  competing  in  the  home  country,  bodyweight)  and  of  the 
competition  (number  of  competitors),  Rankitj(s-1)  is  the  ranking  of  athlete  i,  in  year  t,  in 
competition j at the end of stage s-1; f(·) is a flexible functional form for the relation between 
interim rank and announcement, we only require f(·) to be linear in the vector of parameters β1; 
Successitj(s-1) is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if the previous attempt was 
successful;  the  random  variable  eitjs  captures  all  of  the  unobserved  determinants  of  an 
announcement. Finally, β2, β3 are scalars, whereas β0 and β1 are vectors of parameters to be 
estimated. 
The model includes success in the previous round because the rules of the game dictate a 
minimum increase of 1 Kg after a successful attempt. The level of the previous announcement is 
                                                 
19 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the first stage. In estimating model (1) we 
also dropped the first stage of clean & jerk because the impact of previous announcement and success may be very different 
during the transition from snatch to clean & jerk, which allows heavier weights to be lifted. The results, however, are not driven 
by the inclusion or omission of the first stage of clean & jerk. 12 
 
also  included,  as  we  want  to  allow  for  decreasing  increments  as  the  absolute  level  of  the 
announced weight increases.
20 
Cross-sectional estimates of model (1) will produce biased estimates of all parameters, unless 
one is able to control for the athletes’ ability, which is likely to affect both interim ranking and 
announcements. Unobserved individual ability may also vary over time, as the quality of each 
athlete’s training may vary across years, or even for different competitions within the same year. 
Moreover, the organization of each type of competition may vary across years in ways that are 
unobserved to the econometrician, and this may impact athletes’ behavior. Hence, one needs to 
account for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The error term in (1) can be thought of as the sum of athlete, year, competition, athlete-year, 
competition-year, athlete-competition, athlete-year-competition components,  
eitjs = τi  + τt  + τj + τs + τit + τjt + τij + τitj + εitjs                                                                        (2) 
where  εitjs  captures  idiosyncratic  shocks  to  the  announcement  decision,  εitjs~IID(0,σε
2). 
Alternative  specifications  are  possible,  depending  on  whether  unobserved  heterogeneity  is 
thought to vary across athletes, years, type of competitions, or their interactions. In the next 
section, we will report the results using a number of alternative specifications for the unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Since  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  likely  to  be  correlated  with  previous  announcements, 
performance in previous stages, and therefore interim rank, the random effects assumption is 
unlikely to be appropriate in this case. Thus, we choose to work with a fixed effects model. Due 
to the multi-stage nature of weightlifting competitions, we can include athlete-year-competition 
                                                 
20
 As the minimum increment after a successful attempt is 1 Kg, one could rewrite model (1) as follows: 
Announcementitjs = [Announcementitj(s-1) + Successitj(s-1)]+  
       [Xitj b0 + f(Rankitj(s-1), b1) + b2 Announcementitj(s-1) + b3 Successitj(s-1) + eitjs],  
where the first bracket is the automatic announcement, dictated by the rules of the game, and the second is the discretionary 
announcement,  capturing  athletes’  risk  taking  behavior.  Thus,  the  function  f(.)  captures  the  impact  of  rank  on  athletes’ 
discretionary announcement, while the parameters β2 and β3 in model (1) capture the joint effect on both the automatic and the 
discretionary announcement (β2=1+b2; β3=1+b3). 13 
 
fixed effects (τitj). In this case, the relation between interim rank and announcement is estimated 
only by exploiting the variability of ranking across stages of the same competition for a given 
individual. 
However, the existence of a lagged dependent variable in (1) implies that the fixed effects 
estimator  may  be  biased.  To  overcome  this  problem  we  assume  that  Rankitj(s-1),  
Announcementitj(s-1),  and  Successitj(s-1)  are  predetermined,  i.e.,  they  may  be  correlated  with 
previous realizations of εitjs, so they may depend on unobserved determinants of the choice of the 
announcement in previous stages, but they are not correlated with current and future shocks to 
the announcement decision. Including these variables in one single vector of regressors Witj(s-1), 
we assume that E(εitjs|τitj, Xitj, Witj(s-1), Witj(s-2),…, Witj1)=0.
21  
Consider  now  the  richest  specification  with  athlete-year-competition  fixed  effects  (τitj).  First 
differencing the model eliminates the fixed effects, 
∆Announcementitjs = ∆Witj(s-1)γ + ∆εitjs.                                                                             (3) 
and  once-lagged  predetermined  regressors,  Witj(s-2),  are  valid  instruments  for  ∆Witj(s-1),  so 
parameters can be estimated using an IV approach (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). We also employ 
more efficient GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) by taking 
into account all the available moment restrictions. Taking first differences and using instrumental 
variables also deals with the potential bias induced by the relatively short panel. The results, 
reported  in  the  next  section,  are  remarkably  stable  across  specifications  and  estimation 
methodologies.  
Finally, our specification assumes that the control variables and fixed effects in (1) capture the 
main determinants of risk taking behavior. One concern could be that a higher concentration of 
                                                 
21 If  f(Rankitj(s-1), β1)  is  a  polynomial  function,  then  Witj(s-1)  will  include  not  only  Rankitj(s-1)  but  also  its  square,  cube,  etc., 
depending on the order of the polynomial. 14 
 
athletes  with  very  similar  performance  may  affect  an  individual’s  behavior.  Similarly,  the 
absolute distance from the closest athletes (following or proceeding) in the ranking may also 
make a difference. Risk taking may be more rewarding if an athlete leads the closest trailer by a 
relatively substantial amount, but trails the closest leader by relatively little. We explore these 
issues in our robustness analysis. None of our results change in any fundamental way. 
3.2. The Determinants of Performance  
We estimate the impact of interim rank on performance using the linear probability model: 
Successitjs = Xitj δ0 + g(Rankitj(s-1), δ1) + δ2 Announcementitjs + uitjs                                              (4) 
where  Successitjs  is  a  binary  indicator  that  takes  the  value  of  one  if  athlete  i,  in  year  t,  in 
competition  j,  at  stage  s  (s=2,...,6)
22  was  successful  in  lifting  the  announced  weight 
(Announcementitjs),  Xitj  is  the  same  vector  of  exogenous  individual  and  competition 
characteristics as before, Rankitj(s-1) is the interim rank of individual i, in year t and competition j, 
in the previous stage; uitjs is an error term that captures unobserved determinants of a successful 
lift. Our main interest is in the vector of parameters δ1 in the flexible functional form g(·), which 
describes the impact of rank on the probability of success, controlling for announcement. As 
above, we require g(·) to be linear in the parameters δ1. The parameter δ2 describes the impact of 
announcement on the probability of a successful lift. In terms of Figure 1, it is an estimate of the 
average slope of athletes’ risk-reward frontier. 
As before, we need to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved athletes’ ability, for 
example, is likely to be correlated with both interim ranking and the probability of a successful 
lift.  Thus,  the  random  effects  assumption  seems  unrealistic  and  we  consider  a  fixed  effects 
framework. We correct for unobserved heterogeneity by extensively controlling for fixed effects. 
In particular, the error term in (4) can be decomposed as in (2): 
                                                 
22 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the first stage.  15 
 
 uitjs = τi  + τt  + τj + τs + τit + τjt + τij + τitj + ηitjs                                                               (5) 
where  ηitjs  describes  the  random  component  of  performance,  ηitjs~IID(0,ση
2).
23  This 
idiosyncratic  component  allows  for  random  errors  by  the  athletes,  or  for  unforeseen 
circumstances affecting the performance of an athlete during a lift. As above, our most general 
specification allows for athlete-year-competition fixed effects. 
The assumption of strict exogeneity of interim rank and announcement in (4) is likely to be 
violated,  since  both  variables  may  depend  on  the  outcome  of  previous  attempts.
24  We  then 
proceed under the assumption that such variables are predetermined. Including Rankitj(s-1) and 
Announcementitjs  in  a  single  vector  Zitj(s-1),  we  assume  that  E(ηitjs|τitj,  Xitj,  Zitj(s-1),  Zitj(s-2),…, 
Zitj1)=0. First differencing model (4) we obtain  
∆Successitjs = ∆Ζitj(s-1) θ1 + ∆ηitjs                                                                                      (6) 
As before, lagged pre-determined regressors can be used as instruments. In contrast to the 
results on risk taking, we will show that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and accounting 
for endogeneity greatly affects the estimated impact of interim rank on performance.  
The model presented in this section provides considerable computational advantages over a 
limited dependent variable model with endogenous explanatory variables and fixed effects. In 
fact, few results are available for this class of models (see Arellano and Honorè, 2001 for a 
survey). In practice, one has to weigh the simplicity and flexibility of the linear fixed effects 
framework against the obvious disadvantage that the predicted probabilities may not lie between 
                                                 
23 The assumption that ηitjs~IID(0,ση
2) implies that there is no correlation between ηitjs and εitjr. This assumption is not essential 
for identification, and could be relaxed, but it simplifies the analysis and is realistic in our application. The shocks ηitjs capture 
events that occur during the competition and may affect the performance of the athletes (e.g., the behavior of the public during 
the competition). Any variable which is fixed at the individual level, for a given competition, is captured by the athlete-year-
competition fixed effects. Discussions with coaches and athletes indicated that athletes typically concentrate on successfully 
lifting the weight chosen by their coaches.
 Although coaches and athletes do communicate during the game, it is unlikely that the 
coach incorporates in the announcement decision the idiosyncratic effects captured by the error term ηitjs. Moreover, the variables 
captured  by  ηitjs  are  likely  to  be  realized  only  during  –  or  just  before  –  the  attempt,  so  they  are  unlikely  to  affect  the 
announcement, which is made at the beginning of the stage.  
24 For example, the correlation between interim ranking and previous performance may potentially give rise to an upward bias in 
the impact of interim rank because of mean reversion. Hence, it is important to deal explicitly with the potential endogeneity of 
interim ranking. 16 
 
zero and one (see Bernard and Jensen, 2004). In our application, the linear model is particularly 
appealing  because  it  avoids  putting  restrictions  on  the  correlation  between  regressors  and 
individual heterogeneity. In the next section, we provide extensive robustness analysis using 
alternative specifications and also a fixed effects logit model. The results are not affected in any 
fundamental way. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Impact of Rank on Announcement 
We  first  explore  the  relationship  between  interim  rank  and  announcement  using  a  fully 
flexible binary-variable specification for f(Rankitj(s-1), β1), 
f(Rankitj(s-1), β1)=Σn β1n Rank(n)itj(s-1),  
where Rank(n)itj(s-1) is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i is ranked n
th at the end 
of stage s-1. Table 2 reports results for model (1) using alternative fixed effects specifications.
25 
Column 1 provides the estimated coefficients when we control for athlete, year and competition 
fixed effects separately, whereas column 5 reports the estimates from our richest specification 
(including joint athlete-year-competition fixed effects). The omitted rank category throughout 
the table corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of 
being ranked n
th relative to being first.  
Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients from Table 2 to facilitate comparison. Two clear 
patterns emerge. First, when lagging behind, competitors tend to adopt riskier strategies than 
those  in  the  lead.  Second,  risk-taking  exhibits  an  inverted-U  relationship  with  rank: 
announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then decrease for further decreases in rank 
                                                 
25 Throughout the paper, we report robust standard errors clustered by athlete. All equations include stage of the competition 
binary indicators. Table 2 reports only the coefficients of the first thirteen rank dummies; the full table is reported in Appendix 1 
(Table A1). 17 
 
until  seventeenth  place,  after  which  there  is  no  significant  effect.  The  relation  is  precisely 
estimated and the alternative fixed effects specifications provide very similar results.
26 
Table 3 reports results for model (3), where we approximate f(.) using a fifth order polynomial 
of Rankitj(s-1). Column 1 reports the results obtained with the fixed effects estimator. Column 2 
reports those obtained by taking first differences to eliminate the athlete-competition-year fixed 
effects,  and  then  using  the  IV  estimator  (where  instruments are  the  once-lagged regressors). 
Column  3  reports  the  results  obtained  from  the  model  in  first  differences  using  the  GMM 
estimator, which exploits all the available moment restrictions.
27 Figure 3 plots the impact of 
interim rank on announcement for each estimation strategy. 
The inverse-U relationship between interim rank and announcement clearly emerges from all 
estimation strategies. Announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then decrease for 
further decreases in rank. A change in ranking from first to somewhere between 11
th and 15
th  
has no impact on an athlete’s announcement strategy. The relationship progressively flattens 
towards the bottom of the ranking, where changes in rank have little impact on behavior. 
The non-linear impact of interim rank on announcement is always statistically significant. 
Relative to the fixed effects estimators in Figure 2, accounting for endogeneity implies a more 
pronounced  peak  in  the  impact  of  rank  on  announcement.  When  ranked  sixth,  an  athlete 
announces  at  least  1.8Kg  more  than  when  ranked  first,  which  is  50  percent  of  the  average 
increase in announcement between two stages (see Table 1).  
The other estimated coefficients in Table 2 and 3 are in line with expectations. Both the 
impact of the previous announcement and the success indicator are positive and significant, as 
athletes cannot decrease their announcement  and must increase it after a successful  attempt. 
                                                 
26 Figure  A1  plots  the  estimated  coefficients  and  confidence  interval  on  the  twenty  rank  binary  indicators  from  our  most 
restrictive specifications in Table 2, column 5. 
27 We choose to use a smooth function f(.) to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and the number of instruments. 
The results do not change using higher order polynomials and the coefficients of the sixth or higher power of Rankitj(s-1) are never 
significantly different from zero. 18 
 
Also,  in  the  first  three  columns  of  Table  2,  we  can  estimate  the  impact  of  some  athletes’ 
characteristics. Being heavier (within a given category in a specific competition) implies higher 
announcements. This confirms a well-known fact in weightlifting that a higher body mass allows 
athletes’ to lift heavier weights. The number of competitors has a positive, but very small effect 
on announcement.
28 Finally, competing at home does not seem to induce athletes to take greater 
risks, as the coefficient on Homeitj is never significant. 
4.2  Interpretation of the impact of rank on announcement  
Conventional wisdom from sports competitions tells us that the trailing team may have a large 
incentive to adopt riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up with the leaders (Grund and Gurtler, 
2005).  Similarly,  it  has  been  argued  that  troubled  firms  and  interim  losers  in  corporate 
tournaments  are  more  likely  to  take  riskier  strategies  than  market  leaders  (Bowman,  1982; 
Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
29 
The fact that the impact of rank is positive up to rank seventeen is broadly consistent with this 
literature. 
The progressive flattening of the relation after the first six positions is also consistent with 
differences  in  risk  taking  behavior  at  different  points  in  the  ranking.  Since  rewards  are 
decreasing at a decreasing rate going down in the ranking, the benefit from variability in rank is 
expected to decrease substantially towards the bottom of the ranking, where catching up with the 
leaders becomes progressively more unlikely. 
Some  additional  details  further  support  the  link  between  the  results  in  Figure  2  and 
differences in risk-taking behavior at different positions in the ranking. If changes in the benefits 
deriving from risk taking drive the results in Figure 2, then we expect to observe particularly 
                                                 
28 Coefficients  from  columns  1  indicate  that  having  ten  additional  participants  implies  an  average  increase  of  0.06  Kg  in 
announcements. 
29 This intuition has been formalized by Cabral (2003), Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2003), and Anderson and Cabral (2007). 19 
 
large differences between the estimated coefficients at ranks one and two. For while the leader 
has  no  gain  from  variability  in  rank,  the  second  athlete  may  significantly  gain  from  rank 
variability. We also expect to observe large differences between rank 3 and 4. In fact, prizes in 




provides incentives to take riskier strategies when ranked 4
th than when ranked 3
rd.
31 
We  find  strong  support  for  these  hypotheses:  the  coefficient  for  rank  two  is  statistically 
different  from  zero  at  conventional  levels  (Table  2,  column  5),  and  so  is  the  difference  in 
coefficients between rank three and four.
32 Moreover, the differences between rank one and two 
(0.397 Kg), and three and four (0.235 Kg), are larger than any other difference between adjacent 
ranks.  
Risk taking and absolute distance from competitors 
The  inverted-U  relationship  of  rank  on  announcement  observed  in  Figure  3  remains 
unchanged when we control for additional variables potentially affecting risk taking behavior. 
For example, we would expect athletes to take more risks and increase their announcement in an 
attempt to overtake their competitor if they are relatively close to the athlete just above them, but 
relatively far from the competitor just below in the interim rank. On the contrary, we would 
expect athletes to reduce risk taking and try to defend their position if they are relatively far from 
the competitor just above, but close to the competitor below in the interim rank.  
For  each  observation,  we  compute  the  difference  in  score  between  each  athlete  and  the 
athletes ranked just above and below. We then classify each observation in one of four categories 
and define four corresponding indicator variables: FF when a given athlete is far from both the 
athletes leading and following (1 percent of the observations); FC when a given athlete is far 
                                                 
30 See Section 2 and Appendix B. 
31 The discontinuity in rewards locally affects the concavity of the relation between rewards and rank, so that incentives to take 
risks are drastically different just above and below this threshold. 
32 F(1, 3762)=11.47, p-value=0.001. 20 
 
from the athlete leading but close to the athlete following (4 percent); CF in the opposite case (5 
percent); and finally CC when both are close (90 percent).
33 We then use CC as the base line 
category, and include the remaining three indicators in model (1). Results using model (3) are 
reported Table A2, column 1. Announcement is 1.2 kg higher when the competitor in front is 
close but the trailing athlete is far (CF) relative to the baseline category, while 1.2 Kg lower in 
the opposite case (FC), and not significantly different when both are far (FF). Most importantly, 
the  coefficients  on  rank  imply  that  the  pattern  in  Figure  3  is  not  affected.  The  results  are 
consistent with the incentives to take risk discussed in the literature (Bronars and Oettinger, 
2001).  This  further  supports  the  relation  between  announcement  decision  and  risk  taking 
behavior. 
 
Risk taking and intensity of the competition 
A second concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with similar performance 
might  affect  individuals’  risk  taking,  as  competition  becomes  more  intense.  We  construct  a 
measure  of  the  intensity  of  the  competition  which  varies  at  the  individual  level  within  a 
competition. Given the interim score sitjs of athlete i, in year t, competition j, and stage s, we 
compute the number (Nitjs) of athletes k≠i with interim score sktjs within a 10Kg radius: (sitjs-10)≤ 
sktjs < (sitjs+10). We then construct a binary indicator for tough competitions, which is equal to 
one when our measure of intensity of the competition is above 50 percent.
34 Table A2, column 2 
reports the results from model (3) when we add the binary indicator for tough competitions. 
                                                 
33 We classify two athletes being far apart if the distance between their interim scores’ is higher than the ninety-fifth percentile of 
the distribution of distances in that particular stage. We also experimented using the ninetieth or the seventy-fifth percentile as the 
cut-off. Our results qualitatively remain the same.   
34 On average, the fraction of competitors within the 10Kg interval is twenty-six percent, with a median of twenty-four percent. 
So the fifty percent cut-off level captures the behavior of athletes facing relatively high concentrations of competitors around 
them (90
th percentile). Results are robust to changes in either the radius around an athlete or the cut-off level that we use. 21 
 
More intense competition stimulates more risk taking. Again, the pattern described in Figure 3 is 
not affected.
35 
4.3 The Impact of Rank on the Probability of a Successful Lift  
We first explore the relationship between interim rank and the probability of a successful lift 
using a fully flexible dummy-variable specification,  
g(Rankitj(s-1), δ1) = Σn δ1n Rank(n)itj(s-1). 
Table  4  reports  results  for  model  (4)  using  alternative  fixed  effects  specifications.
36  The 
omitted rank category corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure 
the impact of being ranked n
th relative to being first. Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients 
from Table 4. 
In sharp contrast to model (1), controlling for more sources of unobserved heterogeneity has a 
substantial impact. There is no significant correlation between interim ranking and probability of 
a  successful  lift  when  we  control  for  athlete,  year  and  competition  fixed  effects  separately. 
However, as we progressively control for more sources of unobserved heterogeneity, a positive 
and statistically significant relationship appears. This result is driven by an omitted variable bias. 
Individuals with higher ability are likely to be ranked towards the top, and they also perform 
better  on  average.  When  we  do  not  control  for  individual  characteristics,  the  rank  variable 
captures the impact of differences in quality, so the performance at the top of the ranking is 
overestimated. Results using the conditional (fixed-effects) logit model show the same positive 
relationship between rank and success (Table A3, column 6). The impact of rank on the log-odds 
of a successful lift is positive and statistically significant. 
                                                 
35 We have also experimented by interacting the indicator for close competitions with the rank dummies and the other regressors 
in model (1). The results are not affected. 
36 All specifications include stage-specific dummy variables. Table 4 reports only the coefficients for the first ten rank dummies. 
The full table is reported in Appendix A (Table A3). 22 
 
As discussed in the previous section, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important 
but does not account for the possible endogeneity of Rankitj(s-1). We expect a negative correlation 
between the lagged error term uitj(s-1) and Rankitj(s-1), since a successful lift typically implies an 
improvement in the interim ranking at the end of the stage (i.e., a decrease of the Rank variable). 
This generates a positive correlation between the change in rank (∆Rankitj(s-1)) and the error term 
(∆ηitjs) of the model in first differences (6). Thus, we expect the fixed effects estimator to be 
biased upwards.  
Table 5, column 1 reports the results obtained with the fixed effects estimator, where g(.) is 
assumed to be a quadratic function of Rankitj(s-1).
37 Column 2 reports the results for model (6) 
using once-lagged pre-determined regressors as  instruments, whereas column 3 reports those 
obtained using all the available moment restrictions. Figure 5 plots the impact of interim rank on 
the probability of a successful lift for each estimation strategy. 
There is a significant positive relationship between ranking and the probability of a successful 
lift, independently of the estimation strategy adopted. Conditional on the announced weight, the 
probability of a successful lift is at least 10 percent higher when an athlete is sixth rather than 
first.  The  relation  between  rank  and  performance  is  slightly  concave,  implying  decreasing 
marginal effects of moving down in the ranking. The IV estimation strategies reveal that the 
fixed effects estimator is indeed biased upwards. The magnitude of the impact of rank is now 
much smaller, at least half of that obtained with the fixed effects estimator.
38 
Finally, the results in Table 5 show that the estimated impact of Announcementitjs is always 
significantly negative, as expected. Higher announcements naturally lead to a lower probability 
                                                 
37 The results do not change using higher order polynomials and the coefficients of the third and higher power of Rankitj(s-1) are 
never significantly different from zero. 
38 It is not worthwhile to deliberately fail an attempt, go down in the ranking and benefit from a higher probability of a successful 
lift.  Given  the  average  probability  of  failing  an  attempt  and  the  realized  distribution  of  scores,  the  implied  gains  do  not 
compensate the losses from forfeiting one attempt. 23 
 
of success, as the individual risk-reward frontier is downward sloping. On average, an increase 
of 1Kg in the weight implies a 1.2 percent decrease in the probability of a successful lift. 
4.4 Interpretation of the impact of rank on performance 
The  results  from  model  (4)  imply  that  moving  towards  the  top  of  the  ranking  decreases 
performance. There are two potential explanations for this surprising result. First, individuals 
exert less effort as they move towards the top of the ranking. Although the marginal increase in 
rewards from  an increase in  rank  is  higher  at  the  top, one cannot  exclude  that effort  might 
decrease. In principle, this could occur (a) because competition is systematically less intense at 
the top, in the sense that differences in interim score across athletes are larger, (b) because the 
potential increase in ranking deriving from a successful lift is smaller at the top, (c) because 
athletes at the top are more tired, or (d) because athletes at the top may have secured their 
position, after having observed the performance of athletes lifting before them.
39  
A second potential explanation is that athletes’ performance may deteriorate when the stakes 
are higher, or the importance of success is higher (Baumeister, 1985), or when there is more 
pressure from other individuals, whether friendly or not (Zajonc, 1965; Baumeister, Hamilton 
and  Tice,  1985).
40  At  the  top  of  the  ranking  stakes  are  higher  as  are  the  importance  of  a 
successful lift and the potential pressure created by the public and the media. This suggests that 
athletes may perform worse when ranked closer to the top. The coaches we interviewed reported 
that  it  is  expected  for  athletes  to  perform  systematically  better  in  training  sessions  than  in 
competitions, which suggests that psychological pressure may indeed be important.  
                                                 
39 One extreme case is when, at the last stage, the athlete in the lead has already secured a gold medal (i.e., he is the last to make 
his attempt and no athlete has lifted a higher weight). 
40 The psychological literature suggests at least two reasons why choking may occur in our setting. First, there may be an optimal 
level of arousal for performing a given task, beyond which increasing incentives may result in poorer performance (Yerkes and 
Dodson,  1908).  Second,  increased  pressure  may  make  people  unconsciously  switch  from  automatic  to  controlled  mental 
processes, in spite of the fact that automatic processes provide higher performance for some types of highly rehearsed tasks 
(Baumeister, 1985). Sports – like weightlifting – involving repetition of the same actions are typical cases of such tasks. 24 
 
The results in Figure 5 are consistent with both explanations. Ranking affects behavior, but 
one cannot identify whether the decrease in performance at the top comes from lower effort or 
choking under pressure, or a combination of both. However, there are circumstances in which the 
two explanations can be distinguished. This is what we study next.  
The effect of intensity of competition 
If effort is lower when competition is less intense, and competition is systematically less 
intense at the top of the ranking, then performance may be decreasing moving towards the top of 
the  ranking,  without  any  psychological  pressure.  This  hypothesis  suggests  controlling  for 
intensity of the competition in model (4).
41 
We estimate model (6) including our measure of intensity of the competition (as defined in 
Section 4.2) among the regressors. The new variable depends on the previous history of the 
competition, so it is treated as predetermined. Table 6, column 2 reports the results. The impact 
of the indicator for close competitions is negative and significant. On average, being in close 
competition decreases the probability of a successful lift by about 14 percent.
42 The fact that 
athletes  underperform  when  competition  becomes  more  intense  runs  counter  to  the  effort 
hypothesis. Most importantly, the positive impact of interim rank on performance suggests that 
our results are not driven by the impact of intensity of the competition on effort. 
The potential gains from a successful lift 
The  second  potential  explanation  for  our  results  is  that,  for  a  given  announcement,  the 
potential gain in rank from a successful lift may increase moving towards the bottom of the 
ranking, leading to an increase in athlete’s effort and performance. To measure this effect we 
compute for each observation the potential improvement in rank position in case of success, 
                                                 
41 The literature suggests that effort (and therefore performance) may be affected by the intensity of competition (Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990). 
42 The  impact  of  rank  on  performance  remains  unaffected  even  when  we  include  the  interaction  between  intensity  of  the 
competition and interim rank. The coefficient of the interaction variable is not significantly different from zero. 25 
 
given the observed performance of all the other competitors.
43 As expected, we find that there is 
an increase in the potential gain from a successful lift as one moves towards the bottom of the 
ranking, but the potential gain in rank is on average small, so that individuals at the bottom of the 
interim ranking are extremely unlikely to reach the top positions and be awarded significant 
prizes.
44 
We then re-estimate model (6) including this measure of potential gains among the regressors. 
Its impact on the level of performance is not statistically significant (Table 6, column 3). The 
impact of rank on performance is still positive and highly significant. Thus, the impact of rank on 
performance is unlikely to be caused by differences in incentives to exert effort at the top and at 
the bottom of the ranking. 
The impact of tiredness on performance 
One  might  argue  that  athletes  at  the  top  of  the  ranking  could  be  more  fatigued,  having 
successfully  lifted  heavier  weights,  and  so  their  performance  may  decrease  in  subsequent 
attempts. We find this explanation unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is not necessarily the 
case that a successful attempt is more tiring than a failed one. Hence, it is not necessarily true 
that athletes are more tired when ranked at the top, since an athlete may be ranked at the bottom 
after a series of ambitious -yet unsuccessful- attempts. Second, we control for tiredness using the 
cumulative weight attempted in previous stages. Results from Table 6, column 4 reveal that its 




                                                 
43This is equal to the athletes’ expected improvement in ranking in case of successful lift, if athletes can perfectly predict the 
outcome of other players’ attempts. 
44 At rank 10, for example, the average gain in case of success is 1.6, at rank 20 it is 3.7, while at rank 35 it is 8.9 rank positions. 
45 The impact of announcement drops, but this is simply due to the high correlation between announcement and cumulative 
weight attempted in previous stages. The results are unchanged when including the interaction of cumulative weight and interim 
rank.  26 
 
Secured positions 
Some athletes may have secured their position before the end of the competition. Since there 
is no penalty for not attempting the announced weight, athletes in such situations typically skip 
their attempt and their performance is recorded as a missing value in our data. In the raw data, 
there are few instances (1 percent) in which this occurred, and the corresponding observations 
are  excluded  from  our  sample.  The  issue  of  having  secured  a  satisfying  position  is  mostly 
relevant  at  the  last  stage  of  the  competition.  Thus,  we  re-estimate  the  model,  dropping  the 
observations for the last stage. The impact of interim rank on performance is unaffected (Table 6, 
column 5).  
Prestigious versus non-prestigious competitions 
There is no doubt that prizes (both monetary and not) and media coverage are much higher for 
the Olympic Games and World Championship than for the European Championship. In addition, 
this difference is particularly pronounced for top ranking athletes than for low ranking ones, who 
do not receive significant prizes, nor any media coverage in either type of competition. Thus, one 
would expect athletes to exert more effort and perform better in more prestigious competitions, 
and particularly when ranked closer to the top.  
To  explore  this  hypothesis,  we  interact  all  explanatory  variables  (rank  and  stage  binary 
indicators and announcement at each stage) in model (4) with a binary variable equal to one for 
less prestigious competitions (European Championships) and zero otherwise.
46 Table 7 reports 
the impact of interim rank on performance in the two types of competitions (computed for the 
average announcement at each stage), which are also plotted in Figure 6.
47 
                                                 
46 The European Championships takes place every year, whereas the World Championships alternate with the Olympic Games, 
taking place every four years. So there are many instances in which the same athlete can participate in both types of competitions 
during a single year. 






P)  for  each  rank  n,  both  for  prestigious  (P=1)  and  non-prestigious 
competitions (P=0), where Announcement
*
s is the average announcement for stage s, and τs
P is the estimated stage-specific 27 
 
Performance is significantly lower in more prestigious competitions: the average difference in 
the two curves in Figure 6 is 13 percent.
48 These findings suggest that psychological pressure 
may indeed dominate the increased effort in important competitions. Moreover, the fact that both 
curves  in  Figure  6  are  upward  sloping  shows  that  the  positive  relation  between  rank  and 
performance  is  robust  when  controlling  for  possible  differences  between  the  two  types  of 
competition.
49 
Diving competitions, the role of announcements and external validity 
Is  the  effect  of  interim  rank  on  performance  solely  a  weightlifting  phenomenon?  We 
investigate the external  validity of the results by  looking  at competitive diving. Competitive 
diving shares most of the features that make weightlifting competitions attractive as a research 
laboratory. First, they are multistage tournaments, interim ranking is precisely computed at each 
stage, and variability in interim ranking is significant. Second, the intentions of competitors are 
clearly indicated, since divers announce in advance the dives they intend to perform.
50 Third, 
performance is clearly measured and publicly reported.
51 
However, diving differs from weightlifting in two important ways. First, each athlete’s entire 
dive list is announced before the beginning of the competition. No changes are allowed. This 
feature  simplifies  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  interim  rank  on  performance,  since 
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficient. Table A4 in the Appendix reports the estimated coefficients controlling for athlete-year fixed effects, which is the 
most restrictive specification we can use. 
48 To control for self-selection of athletes into the two types of competitions, we re-estimate the same model, this time restricting 
the sample to those athletes who participated in both competitions in the same year. The impact of interim rank is reported in 
Table 7, columns 3 and 4. The results are substantially unaffected, although the average distance between the two curves is 
slightly smaller (9 percent). 
49 We also estimate the impact of rank on risk taking in the two types of competition, controlling for athlete-year fixed effects. 
We find that announcements are higher in more prestigious competitions, particularly towards the bottom of the interim ranking. 
Results are reported in Table A4 and Figure A2. 
50 Each dive is identified by an alphanumeric code and a degree of difficulty. Athletes must precisely execute the movements 
required for the announced dives.  
51 Seven judges evaluate each dive. After deleting the two highest and the two lowest scores for each dive, the remaining scores 
are summed to determine the overall score of each dive. Then, dive-specific scores are summed to determine the ranking.  28 
 
announcements cannot respond to any shock which occurs during the competition.
52 Second, 
competitive diving requires a completely different set of abilities than weightlifting (agility vs. 
strength), which makes it an interesting test for the external validity of our previous results on 
the effect of rank on performance.  
We  collected  data  on  international  competitions  (Olympic  Games,  World  and  European 
Championships, and Champions Cup) between  1988 and 2009.  We observe a total of 6,868 
dives, their exact description and their degree of difficulty, the score obtained, the interim and 
final rankings, and the name and country of origin of each diver (see Appendix B for details).  
We estimate 
Scoreitjs = Xitj δ0 + g(Rankitj(s-1), δ1) + δ2 Difficultyitjs, + τitj + uitjs                                                  (7) 
where  Scoreitjs  is  the  score  obtained  by  athlete  i,  in  year  t,  competition  j,  and  stage  s, 
Difficultyitjs is the degree of difficulty for the specific dive performed, and Rankitj(s-1) describes 
the interim ranking. We estimate equation (7) as above, treating Rankitj(s-1) as a pre-determined 
regressor.
53 Table 8, column 1 reports the results using athlete-year-competition fixed effects. In 
the next two columns we take first differences and use first an IV approach, using Rankitj(s-2) as 
instrument for ∆Rankitj(s-1) (column 2), and then a GMM approach exploiting all the available 
moment restrictions (column 3).
54 Figure 7 describes the estimated impact of interim rank on 
performance  in  diving  competitions.  Once  again,  the  impact  of  ranking  on  performance  is 
positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the impact is also substantial: a shift from 
first to tenth place implies an increase in score of at least 6.5, which is 45 percent of the standard 
deviations of the score distribution. 
                                                 
52 On the other hand, we cannot estimate the impact of interim rank on the difficulty of the chosen dives, since they are fixed for 
a given competition. 
53 Because of the rules of diving competitions, we can now treat the announced difficulty as an exogenous variable (but the 
results are not affected if we assume it is just predetermined). 
54 The results do not change using higher order polynomials and the coefficients of the second or higher power of Rankitj(s-1) are 
never significantly different from zero. Results are not affected when we use dive-specific dummies instead of the degree of 
difficulty. 29 
 
The impact of interim rank is not affected when accounting for differences in intensity of the 
competition,  potential  gains,  tiredness  and  overall  prestige  of  the  competition.  The  results, 
reported in Table 9, are consistent with the results in Table 6 obtained from data on weightlifting. 
Performance decreases when competition is more intense (Table 9, column 1), the potential gains 
from a perfectly executed dive increase (column 2), after a series of more difficult dives (column 
3), and in more prestigious competitions (Table A6 and Figure A3). Overall, the results from 
diving  competitions  show  that  our  results  do  not  depend  on  the  type  of  task  performed  by 
competitors, on the timing of announcements, or on whether the performance measure is discrete 
or continuous. 
5. Conclusions 
We provide evidence of how risk taking and performance change depending on the interim 
rank position within a tournament. First, we show that professional athletes take greater risks 
when ranked close enough to the first athlete, but then revert to safer strategies when ranked 
lower. This result is in line with the intuition that laggards may increase risk taking in an effort to 
catch  up  with  the  leaders.  This  result  has  implications  for  the  choice  of  whether  to  reveal 
information on relative performance. For instance, it is typical for firms to periodically observe 
measures of managers’ performance, in order to measure individual productivity and possibly 
implement  incentive  schemes  aimed  at  stimulating  effort.  However,  our  results  show  that 
workers may respond to information on relative performance by changing the riskiness of their 
actions,  thus  disrupting  the  relation  between  effort  and  performance  on  which  simple 
compensation schemes are often based. Since risk taking is typically unobservable, a firm may 
withhold information  on  relative  performance  to  reduce the  unobserved heterogeneity  across 
workers’ strategies. 30 
 
We  also  show  that  risk  taking  increases  when  competition  is  more  intense  (and  in  more 
prestigious  competitions).  Although this  is  likely  to  be  optimal  in  a  sporting  contest,  where 
spectators seek excitement and breathtaking performances, it may not necessarily be so desirable 
within  firms.  If  firm  profitability  is  affected  more by  average  performance than  by  the  rare 
exceptional performance of a few individuals, then increasing the intensity of the competition 
may  reduce overall performance  and profitability. On the other hand, in industries in which 
research and development are fundamental, this may provide workers with the optimal incentives 
to take risks. This may partly explain why contracts based on relative performance are common 
but not ubiquitous, and why they are not uniformly distributed across different types of workers, 
firms or industries. 
Our second set of results concerns the impact of interim rank on performance. We show that 
performance decreases as an athlete gets closer to the top of the interim ranking. This result 
cannot  be  explained  by  unobserved  individual-specific  heterogeneity,  by  differences  in  the 
intensity of the competition, potential gains from increased performance, or physical fatigue at 
different  points  in  the  interim  rank.  We  also  observe  underperformance  in  more  important 
competitions, and when competition is more intense, suggesting that underperformance close to 
the top may result from psychological pressure. This may explain why coping with pressure is 
often mentioned as an important skill for managers, or why contractual agreements may provide 
a safety net for individuals with relatively low performance. We obtain very similar results using 
data from competitive diving, a sport organized according to similar rules, but based on different 
skills. 
Our findings on underperformance at the top imply that the organizer of a tournament may 
withhold information  on  relative  performance  in  order  to  avoid its  heterogeneous  impact  on 
interim  leaders  and  losers.  For  instance,  a  professor  may  withhold  information  on  relative 31 
 
performance  during  the  academic  year  in  order  to  reduce  pressure  on  the  most  promising 
students. On the other hand, providing information on relative performance may be a way to 
handicap interim leaders and keep the competition open. In sporting competitions, it may be 
optimal  to  reveal  interim  ranking  and  let  interim  leaders  deal  with  the  additional  pressure 
generated by the media and the public, thus making the result of the competition less certain.
55 
Although  our  results  suggests  that  information  on  relative  performance  may  hamper 
performance by increasing psychological pressure, the identification of the exact role played by 
emotions remains an open question. In addition, preferences for relative status may play a role in 
explaining  differences  between  the  performance  of  interim  winners  and  losers.
56  Combining 
evidence from the field and from the laboratory may shed light on these issues.
57 
   
                                                 
55 At least in principle, the  tournament  organizer  may  even provide false  information on relative performance, for  example 
understating the performance of interim leaders. An interesting issue then is how participants may factor in such a possibility. 
56 For instance, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2009), and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) find that releasing information on relative 
performance increases performance in situations in which individuals are rewarded according to their absolute (not relative) 
performance. 
57 Hannan  et  al.  (2008)  provide  evidence  that  feedback  on  relative  performance  decreases  performance  on  average,  while 




Anderson, A. and L. Cabral, (2007), “Go for Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice 
of Variance”, Rand Journal of Economics, 38, 593-609. 
Anderson,  T.W.,  and  C.  Hsiao,  (1981),  Estimation  of  Dynamic  Models  with  Error  Components, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76, 598-606.  
Apesteguia, J. and I. Palacios-Huerta, Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence 
from a Randomized Natural Experiment (2010), American Economic Review, forthcoming.  
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297.  
Arellano,  M.  and  Honorè  (2001),  “Panel  data  Models:  Some  Recent  developments”,  Ch.  53  in 
Heckman and E. Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Ariely, D., Gneezy, U., Loewenstein, G. and Mazar, N. (2005), “Large Stakes and Big Mistakes”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 76, 2, 451-469. 
Azmat, G. and N. Iriberri (2010), “The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback Information: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students”, Journal of Public Economics, 
2010, 94 (7-8), 435-452. 
Bandiera,  O.  I.  Barankay  and  I.  Rasul  (2007),  “Incentives  for  Managers  and  Inequality  Among 
Workers:  Evidence  from  a  Firm-Level  Experiment”,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
forthcoming. 
Baumeister,  R.F.,  (1985),  “Choking  under  pressure:  self-consciousness  and  paradoxical  effects  of 
incentives on skilful performance”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 610–620. 
Baumeister, R.F.,  Hamilton,  J., Tice,  D.M.,  (1985),  “Public  versus  private expectancy  of  success: 
Confidence booster or performance pressure?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
48, 1447–1457. 
Becker, B., and M. Huselid (1992), “The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation Systems,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 336–350. 
Bernard,  A.B.,  and  J.B.  Jensen  (2004),  “Why  Some  Firms  Export”,  Review  of  Economics  and 
Statistics, 86, 2, 561-569. 
Blanes  i  Vidal,  J.  and  M.  Nossol (2009),  “Tournaments  without  Prizes:  Evidence  from  Personnel 
Records”, mimeo, London School of Economics.  
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998), “Initial Restrictions and Moment Conditions in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143.  
Bowman, E. H. (1982), “Risk Seeking by Troubled Firms”, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 33-
42. 
Bronars, S. and G. Oettinger (2001), “Effort, Risk Taking, and Participation in Tournaments: Evidence 
from Professional Golf”, mimeo: University of Texas at Austin. 
Brown,  K.,  W.V.  Harlow,  and  L.  Starks  (1996),  “Of  Tournaments  and  Temptations:  Analysis  of 
Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry,” Journal of Finance, 51, pp. 85–110. 
Cabral, L.  (2003),  “R&D Competition When  Firms Choose Variance”, Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 12, 139-150. 
Camerer,  Colin  F.,  Linda  Babcock,  George  Loewenstein,  and  Richard  H.  Thaler  (1997),  “Labor 
Supply of New York City Cab Drivers,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII (May), 407-
441. 
Casas-Arce,  P.  and  A.  Martinez-Jerez  (2009),  “Relative  Performance  Compensation,  Contests  and 
Dynamic Incentives”, Management Science, 55, 1306-1320. 
Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison, (1997), “Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1167–1200. 33 
 
Courty, P. and G. Marschke (2004), “An empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit 
Performance Incentives,” Journal of Labor Economics, 22(1), 23-56. 
Dohmen, T. J., (2008), “Do Professionals Choke under Pressure?” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, vol. 65(3-4), pages 636-653, March. 
Ehrenberg,  R.,  and  Boganno,  M.  (1990),  “Do  Tournaments  Have  Incentive  Effects?”  Journal  of 
Political Economy, 98(6), 1307-1323. 
Eriksson, T. (1999), “Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish 
Data”, Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 2, 262-280. 
Eriksson,  T.,  A.  Poulsen,  and  M.C.  Villeval  (2009),  “Feedback  and  Incentives:  Experimental 
Evidence”, Labour Economics, 16, 679-688. 
Frey, B. S. and Jegen, R. (2001), “Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey Of Empirical Evidence”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 589-611. 
Goriaev, A., Palomino, F., and Prat, A. (2003), “Mutual Fund Tournament: Risk taking Incentives 
Induced by Ranking Objectives”, CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 2794 
Green, J. and N. Stokey (1983), “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts“, Journal of Political 
Economy, 91, 349-365. 
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000a), “Pay enough or don't pay at all,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, CXV (August 2000a), 791-810. 
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000b), “A fine is a price,” Journal of Legal Studies, XXIX (January), 
1-18. 
Grund, C., and O. Gürtler (2005), “An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments”, Applied 
Economics Letters, 12, 457–461 
Hannan,  R.  L.,  R.  Krishnan,  and  A.  Newman  (2008)  “The  Effects  of  Disseminating  Relative 
Performance Feedback in Tournament and Individual Performance Compensation Systems”, The 
Accounting Review, 83(4), 893-913. 
Heyman,  J.  and  D.  Ariely  (2004),  “Effort  for  Payment:  A  Tale  of  Two  Markets,”  Psychological 
Science, Forthcoming. 
Knoeber, C. and W. Thurman (1994), “Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of 
Broiler Production”, Journal of Labor Economics, 12:2, pp. 155–79. 
Lazear, E. (2000), “Performance Pay and Productivity,” American Economic Review, 90(5), 1346-
1361. 
Lazear, E., and S. Rosen (1981), “Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864. 
Lee, J. (2004), “Prize and Risk Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Poker 
Players”, IZA Discussion Paper 1345.  
Main , B., O'Reilly III, C., and Wade, J. (1993), “Top Executive Pay: Tournaments or Team Work?”, 
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 606-628. 
Nalebuff,  B.J.,  and  Stiglitz,  J.E.  (1983),  “Prizes  and  Incentives:  Towards  a  General  Theory  of 
Competition and Compensation”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1, 21-43. 
Oyer,  P.  (1998),  “Fiscal  Year  Ends  and  Non-Linear  Incentive  Contracts:  The  Effect  on  Business 
Seasonality”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 149-185. 
Prendergast, C. (1999), “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
XXXVII, 7-63. 
Yerkes, R. and J. Dodson (1908), “The relationship of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit-
Formation”, Journal of Comparative Neurology of Psychology, 18(5), 459-482. 
Zajonc, B. (1965), “Social Facilitation”, Science, 149, 269-274. FIGURE 1 – THE ATHLETES’ RISK-REWARD FRONTIER 
Pr(successful lift)
Announcement (Kg)
high effort, high ability, or 
low psychologicalpressure









Notes: The figure describes the risk-reward frontiers for two hypothetical athletes of different ability. The better 
athlete is characterized by the frontier located to the right. Each competitor can improve the probability of a 
successful  lift  by  increasing  the  quality  and  intensity  of  training  before  the  competition,  or  by  having  more 
concentration/determination during the game (i.e., by exerting more effort). Higher psychological pressure may 
cause choking and reduce performance. 
 
 





























































































































Notes:  The  figure  plots  the  estimated  impact  of  rank on  announcement  (Kg).  The  coefficients of  the  binary 
indicators for rank positions are reported in Table 2 and Table A1. The different lines on the graph correspond to 
the five columns of Table 2, where we control for different sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The omitted 
category always corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being 
ranked n









































































Notes: The figure plots the impact of interim rank on announcement (Kg) based on the estimated coefficients from 








































































































































Notes: The figure plots the estimated coefficients of the binary indicators for the rank position from Table 4 and 
Table A3. The different lines on the graph correspond to the five columns of Table 4, where we control for 
different sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The omitted category always corresponds to the athlete ranked first, 
so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being ranked n
th relative to being first. 
 
  







































































Notes:  The  figure  plots  the  impact  of  interim  rank  on  the  probability  of  a  successful  lift  based  on  the 




FIGURE 6 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT IN  






























































































































Notes: The figure plots the impact of interim rank (and the 95% confidence interval) on the probability of a 
successful  lift  (computed  for  the  average  announcement  at  each  stage)  in  prestigious  and  non-prestigious 
competitions based on the results reported in Table 7. The impact of rank one in prestigious competitions is 
normalized to zero. Estimated coefficients are reported in Table A4. Calculated standard errors are clustered at 
the athlete level. Performance is significantly lower in prestigious competitions (joint test: F(19, 3762)=4.14, p-
value=0.000).   
 





































































Notes: The figure plots the impact of interim rank on the score achieved based on the estimated coefficients 






 stage 1 stage 2 stage 3 stage 4 stage 5 stage 6
Announcement 122.404 125.953 128.013 150.570 154.808 156.752
average announcement 
Prob. of Success 0.732 0.570 0.397 0.806 0.557 0.317
average probability of a successful lift
TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Snatch Clean & Jerk
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the International Weightlifting Database corresponding to round-by-round athletes' performance data for 
the most well-known international weightlifting competitions (the Olympic Games, World and European Championships) from 1990 to 2006. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs
Rank 2 0.270*** 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.313*** 0.397***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.073) (0.079) (0.087)
Rank 3 0.246*** 0.254*** 0.298*** 0.417*** 0.502***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.081) (0.090)
Rank 4 0.531*** 0.542*** 0.587*** 0.669*** 0.738***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.080) (0.089) (0.099)
Rank 5 0.590*** 0.603*** 0.654*** 0.748*** 0.823***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.081) (0.091) (0.102)
Rank 6 0.654*** 0.668*** 0.731*** 0.823*** 0.891***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.085) (0.092) (0.104)
Rank 7 0.586*** 0.602*** 0.674*** 0.757*** 0.832***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.084) (0.092) (0.105)
Rank 8 0.545*** 0.563*** 0.636*** 0.739*** 0.811***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.085) (0.094) (0.106)
Rank 9 0.568*** 0.586*** 0.634*** 0.758*** 0.816***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.089) (0.096) (0.108)
Rank 10 0.544*** 0.561*** 0.588*** 0.713*** 0.765***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.089) (0.097) (0.110)
Rank 11 0.471*** 0.490*** 0.505*** 0.600*** 0.635***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.090) (0.099) (0.111)
Rank 12 0.430*** 0.448*** 0.463*** 0.565*** 0.589***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.092) (0.103) (0.114)
Rank 13 0.431*** 0.450*** 0.452*** 0.533*** 0.560***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.093) (0.103) (0.113)
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.979*** 0.979*** 0.980*** 0.977*** 0.978***
announcement in previous stage (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Successitj(s-1)  4.170*** 4.171*** 4.177*** 4.213*** 4.209***
success in previous stage (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Bodyweightitj 0.014** 0.014** 0.016**
athlete's bodyweight (in Kg) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Homeitj 0.010 0.007 -0.025
competing in home country (0.057) (0.057) (0.082)
Number of Competitorsitj 0.007*** 0.004 0.008**
competitors at each game (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 27700 27700 27700 27700 27700
Clusters 3763 3763 3763 3763 3763
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes





TABLE 2 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. All equations include stage of the 
competition binary indicators. The first three columns also include country of origin binary indicators. The coefficients for ranks 14-20 are omitted; the full 
table is reported in Appendix A (Table A1).  Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FE FD (IV) FD (GMM)
Dependent variable Announcement itjs   Announcement itjs   Announcement itjs  
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.536*** 0.727*** 0.697***
announcement in previous stage (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Successitj(s-1)  2.738*** 3.318*** 2.824***
success in previous stage (0.071) (0.133) (0.096)













itj(s-1)  (x 10




itj(s-1)  (x 10
-5) 0.014* 0.103*** 0.099***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 27700 27700 27700
Clusters 3763 3763 3763
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. 
The first column is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The other two columns are 
estimated using first differences. In column (2) we use as instruments once-lagged predetermined regressors, 
whereas in column (3) we use all available moment restrictions. All equations include stage of the competition 
binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in column 1. Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis in 
columns 2 and 3: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs  
Rank 2 -0.038* -0.040** -0.033 0.021 0.039
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Rank 3 -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.042* 0.041 0.070**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
Rank 4 -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.031 0.068** 0.131***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
Rank 5 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.045* 0.075*** 0.149***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
Rank 6 -0.051** -0.054** -0.006 0.117*** 0.202***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
Rank 7 -0.037 -0.041* 0.018 0.148*** 0.240***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030)
Rank 8 -0.012 -0.015 0.040 0.173*** 0.269***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
Rank 9 -0.001 -0.005 0.061** 0.207*** 0.310***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
Rank 10 0.015 0.013 0.082*** 0.230*** 0.338***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
Announcementitjs * stage2 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Announcementitjs * stage3 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Announcementitjs * stage4 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Announcementitjs * stage5 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Announcementitjs * stage6 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bodyweightitj 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010**
athlete's bodyweight in Kg (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Homeitj 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.103***
competing in home country (0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
Number of Competitorsitj -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007***
competitors at each game (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 34625 34625 34625 34625 34625
Clusters 3763 3763 3763 3763 3763
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes





TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt to lift a given weight, by athlete i, in 
year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game, was successful.  All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. 
The first three columns also include country of origin binary indicators. The coefficients for ranks 11-20 are omitted; the full table 
is reported in Appendix A (Table A3).  Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FE FD (IV) FD (GMM)
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs  
Announcementitjs -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




itj(s-1)  (x 10
-3) -0.461*** -0.343*** -0.381***
(0.058) (0.106) (0.104)
Observations 27700 27700 27700
Clusters 3763 3763 3763
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage 
s of the game. The first column is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The 
other two columns are estimated using first differences. In column 2 we use as instruments once-
lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in column 3 we use all available moment restrictions. All 
equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete 
level are reported in parentheses in column 1. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors 
based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis in columns 2 and 3: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FD (GMM) FD (GMM) FD (GMM) FD (GMM) FD (GMM)
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs   Pr(success) itjs  
Announcementitjs -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.000 -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Rankitj(s-1)   0.028*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.041***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Rank
2
itj(s-1)  (x 10
-3) -0.381*** -0.299*** -0.368*** -0.475** -0.616***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.108) (0.187) (0.128)
Close Competition -0.143***
dummy=1 if competitors' density within 10Kg radius is high (0.021)
Potential Gains 0.008
potential change in rank if successful (0.006)
Tiredness -0.001***
cumulative kilos attempted (0.000)
Observations 27700 27700 27700 27700 20775
Clusters 3763 3763 3763 3763 3763
TABLE 6 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Column 1 simply 
reproduces column 3 from Table 5 to ease comparisons. In column 5 we exclude from the estimation the last stage of the competition. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a 
two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-prestigious Prestigious Non-prestigious Prestigious
Rank 1 0.070* 0.016
(0.040) (0.055)
Rank 2 0.116*** 0.000 0.055 -0.010
(0.039) (0.032) (0.060) (0.066)
Rank 3 0.160*** 0.000 0.052 -0.040
(0.039) (0.034) (0.059) (0.063)
Rank 4 0.163*** 0.048 0.047 -0.065
(0.039) (0.036) (0.063) (0.065)
Rank 5 0.165*** 0.059* 0.050 -0.028
(0.040) (0.036) (0.066) (0.062)
Rank 6 0.220*** 0.094*** 0.104 -0.070
(0.041) (0.037) (0.068) (0.066)
Rank 7 0.255*** 0.122*** 0.126* -0.003
(0.041) (0.037) (0.070) (0.067)
Rank 8 0.283*** 0.148*** 0.100 0.039
(0.041) (0.037) (0.069) (0.066)
Rank 9 0.315*** 0.183*** 0.157** 0.054
(0.042) (0.037) (0.069) (0.070)
Rank 10 0.350*** 0.199*** 0.177** 0.093
(0.043) (0.037) (0.074) (0.068)
Rank 11 0.362*** 0.230*** 0.197** 0.055
(0.043) (0.037) (0.076) (0.069)
Rank 12 0.378*** 0.272*** 0.153* 0.150**
(0.045) (0.038) (0.079) (0.073)
Rank 13 0.430*** 0.281*** 0.235*** 0.116
(0.045) (0.038) (0.083) (0.071)
Rank 14 0.422*** 0.300*** 0.276*** 0.088
(0.048) (0.038) (0.088) (0.077)
Rank 15 0.500*** 0.327*** 0.312*** 0.149**
(0.050) (0.038) (0.095) (0.075)
Rank 16 0.487*** 0.369*** 0.221** 0.185**
(0.051) (0.039) (0.091) (0.084)
Rank 17 0.520*** 0.383*** 0.349*** 0.195**
(0.057) (0.041) (0.094) (0.081)
Rank 18 0.516*** 0.416*** 0.147 0.237***
(0.063) (0.040) (0.154) (0.077)
Rank 19 0.566*** 0.448*** 0.167 0.216**
(0.066) (0.042) (0.135) (0.090)
Rank 20 0.649*** 0.501*** 0.440*** 0.226***
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Notes: The table reports the impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift for the average announcement:  
dn
PRank(n) + (1/5)Ss (ls
PAnnouncement*s+ts
P) for each rank n, both for prestigious (P=1) and non-prestigious competitions 
(P=0), where Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and ts
P is the estimated stage-specific coefficient. The 
impact of rank one in prestigious competitions is normalized to zero. The estimated coefficients using athlete-year FE are 
reported in Appendix A (Table A4). The sample size in the last two columns is restricted to the athletes that participated in 
both types of games in the same year. (1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FE FD (IV) FD (GMM)
Dependent variable Score itjs   Score itjs   Score itjs  
Degree of Difficultyitjs 11.232*** 9.960*** 9.902***
(1.095) (1.122) (1.195)
Rankitj(s-1)   1.958*** 0.569** 0.693**
(0.181) (0.275) (0.291)
Observations 3029 3029 3029
Clusters 364 364 364
TABLE 8 - THE IMPACT OF INTERIM RANK ON PERFORMANCE IN DIVING
Notes: The dependent variable is the score achieved by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. 
The first column is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The other two columns are estimated 
using first differences. In column (2) we use as instruments once-lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in 
column (3) we use all available moment restrictions. All equations include stage of the competition binary 
indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in column 1. Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis in columns 2 
and 3: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FD (GMM) FD (GMM) FD (GMM)
Dependent variable Score itjs   Score itjs   Score itjs  
Degree of Difficultyitjs 9.921*** 13.773*** 9.364***
the degree of difficulty of the attempted dive (1.193) (0.951) (1.252)
Rankitj(s-1)   0.654** 2.547*** 0.699**
(0.294) (0.215) (0.291)
Close Competition -1.281*
Dummy = 1 if competitors' density within 10 points radius is high (0.659)
Potential Gains -3.651***
number of gained ranks if perfect score (0.134)
Tiredness -0.863**
cumulative degree of difficulty attempted (0.354)
Observations 3029 3029 3029
Clusters 364 364 364
TABLE 9 - THE IMPACT OF INTERIM RANK ON PERFORMANCE IN DIVING - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the score achieved by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. All equations include stage of the 
competition binary indicators. All available moment restrictions are used in the estimation. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a 
two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.